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The meteoric rise of the Internet as a communication medium
has profoundly affected American culture. The Internet has forever
changed the way that Americans communicate, consume information
and media, and purchase goods and services. In particular, electronic
mail, or "e-mail" has become a ubiquitous part of American life.
Written messages that, just ten years ago, would have been
painstakingly handwritten or typed and mailed out to arrive at the
recipient two to three days later are now sent in a matter of seconds.
The benefits of e-mail are countless.
Friends can quickly and
conveniently stay in contact. Pictures and documents can be attached
to e-mail messages and sent instantly over the Internet. One's entire
social group may be notified in one fell swoop of a social happening by
simply pressing a "send" button.
There is a downside to e-mail, however. Just as the average
American may expect to find her mailbox stuffed with unsolicited junk
mail on a daily basis, so too may the average American expect to find
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her e-mail inbox stuffed with commercial unsolicited bulk e-mail on a
daily basis. Pitching everything from libido-enhancing herbal drugs of
dubious effectiveness to online universities to penny stock schemes,
unsolicited bulk e-mail, known popularly as "spam,"1 is nearly as old
2
as the Internet itself.
Many find the daily process of sifting through spam to be a
maddening and unnecessarily time-consuming process. Sometimes, email users will accidentally delete legitimate, important e-mails while
deleting spam messages. Many people's moral sensibilities are
offended by the intrusion into their e-mail inboxes of spam messages
containing pornographic or salacious themes.
Spam's costs to society go beyond simple annoyance and
offense, however. Some estimates place the cost of spam to U.S.
businesses in 2003 anywhere from $10 billion to $87 billion. 3 Each
spam message that a company's employee is forced to read and delete
4
costs the company approximately $.70 to $1 in lost productivity.
Approximately forty percent of all e-mail messages sent in the United
States in 2003 were spam, up from eight percent in 2001. 5 By 2005,

spam was estimated to comprise a mind-boggling eighty percent of all
e-mail messages sent.6 In 2004, estimates placed the number of sent
unsolicited bulk e-mail messages at approximately two billion per
day. 7 Not everyone suffers from spamming. Spamming is quite a
lucrative business for the spammers themselves. 8 In fact, in the
absence of laws prohibiting such activities, there is little financial
incentive to stop.
1.

Throughout this note, I will refer frequently to unsolicited bulk commercial e-

mail by its popular name, "spam." I will also use the term "spammer" to denote someone
who is engaged in the business of sending unsolicited bulk commercial e-mail.
2.
See Sameh I. Mobarek, Note, The CAN-SPAM Act of 2003: Was Congress
Actually Trying to Solve the Problem or Add to It?, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 247, 248
(2004) (discussing the etymology of the term "spam" as applied to unsolicited bulk e-mail).
3.
Jordan M. Blanke, Canned Spam: New State and Federal Legislation Attempts
to Put a Lid On It, 7 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 305, 305 (2004).
4.
Charles E. Ramirez & Karen Dybis, Anti-spam Battle Saps Businesses; Junk EMails Cost Companies $10 Billion a Year; Michigan Debates New Laws to Stem Assault,
DETROIT NEWS, June 10, 2003, at lA.
5.
Jonathon Krim, Spam's Cost to Business Escalates; Bulk E-Mail Threatens
Communication Arteries, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2003, at Al.
6.
Tom Zeller, Jr., Law BarringJunk E-Mail Allows a Flood Instead, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 2005, at Al.
Jon Swartz, Net Providers Sue Scads of Spammers, USA TODAY, Mar. 11, 2004,
7.
at lB.
8.
Prosecutors estimated an arrested spammer's personal fortune from spamming
at $24 million. See Emma Schwartz, Virginia Hopes Spam Verdicts Send Message; A New
State Law Makes Fraudulent, Unsolicited Mass E-mailings a Felony, and in Prosecutors'
FirstConviction, the Jury Urges Prison Time, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2004, at A20.
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Over the past several years, numerous states and the Federal
Government have enacted measures to combat the growing tide of
spam. One of the major issues that such state legislation raises is
that of the dormant Commerce Clause as applied to anti-spam
regulation. This note will analyze the implications of the dormant
Commerce Clause as applied to Virginia's stringent anti-spam law,
under which two spammers have already been convicted of felony
spamming.
Part I will lay out the background of anti-spam
legislation, case law involving other state statutes, and a brief history
of United States Supreme Court dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.
Part II will examine the validity of state spam
regulation under the Federal CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 and current
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, using Virginia's anti-spam
law as an example. Finally, Part III will examine the shortcomings of
the CAN-SPAM Act and will assert that anti-spam regulation is an
area best left to states and their police powers.
I. BACKGROUND
In response to the growing problem of spam, on April 29, 2003,
the Virginia legislature passed a stringent anti-spam law. 9 The
statute states:
A. Any person who:
1. Uses a computer or computer network with the intent to falsify or forge
electronic mail transmission information or other routing information in any
manner in connection with the transmission of unsolicited bulk electronic mail
through or into the computer network of an electronic mail service provider or its
subscribers; or
2. Knowingly sells, gives, or otherwise distributes or possesses with the intent
to sell, give, or distribute software that (i) is primarily designed or produced for the
purpose of facilitating or enabling the falsification of electronic mail transmission
information or other routing information; (ii) has only limited commercially
significant purpose or use other than to facilitate or enable the falsification of
electronic mail transmission information or other routing information; or (iii) is
marketed by that person acting alone or with another for use in facilitating or
enabling the falsification of electronic mail transmission information or other
routing information is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.
B. A person is guilty of a Class 6 felony if he commits a violation of subsection
A and:

9.

See Saul Hansell, Virginia Law Makes Span, With Fraud, A Felony, N.Y.

TIMES, April 30, 2003, at C1.
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1. The volume of UBE transmitted exceeded 10,000 attempted recipients in
any 24-hour period, 100,000 attempted recipients in any 30-day time period, or one
million attempted recipients in any one-year time period; or
2. The revenue generated from a specific UBE transmission exceeded $1,000 or
the total revenue generated from all UBE transmitted to any EMSP exceeded $
50,000.
C. A person is guilty of a Class 6 felony if he knowingly hires, employs, uses, or
permits any minor to assist in the transmission of UBE in violation of subdivision
B 1 or subdivision B 2.10

This statute made possible prison terms of one to five years
and forfeiture of all gains connected with spamming activities
proscribed under the statute.1 1 The law replaced a 1999 Virginia
statute that mandated mere civil sanctions for spammers. 12 Virginia's
governor signed the bill enacting the statute at Internet provider
America Online's Virginia headquarters. 13
At this ceremony,
Governor Mark R. Warner hailed the passage of the statute stating, "it
is appropriate that we give our prosecutors tools to go after this costly
14
and annoying crime."
A. The Virginia Law in Action
On December 11, 2003, Virginia authorities arrested Jeremy
Jaynes, a North Carolina resident, on four counts of transmitting
spam fraudulently through servers based in Virginia, in violation of
section 18.2-152.3:1 of the Virginia Code. 15 According to spam
watchdog organization, Spamhaus.org, Jaynes, who went by the alias
"Gaven Stubberfield," was the eighth most prolific spammer in the
world. 16 Jaynes was the first person to be charged under the Virginia
17
law and was the first felony spam indictment in the United States.
Virginia authorities also charged a business associate of Jaynes',
Richard Rutkowski, at that time. 18 On April 7, 2004, Virginia

10.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.3:1 (2005).
11.
See Hansell, supra note 9, at C1.
12.
See Steven Ginsberg & R.H. Melton, Va. Blocks Bulk E-Mailers; Warner Hails
New Law to Attack 'Spam Invasion, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2003, at B1.
13.
See id.
14.
See id.
15.
Virginia Charges 2 Under New Spam Law, CHI. TRIBUNE, Dec. 12, 2003, at C1
[hereinafter Virginia Charges2].
16.
Karin Brulliard, Jury Finds 2 Guilty of Felony Spam; Loudoun Convictions Are
First in Nation, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2004, at El.
17.
Dan Thanh Dang, Spammer Suspect Arrested in N.C.; Felony Indictment Under
New Va. Law is Called First for Nation, BALT. SUN, Dec. 12, 2003, at 1D.
18.
Id.
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authorities charged and arrested a third suspect in the spam ring,
Jessica Jaynes DeGroot, Jaynes' sister.19The three allegedly sent more
than 100,000 unsolicited e-mails in a 30-day period during summer
2003, promoting penny stocks and software to erase Internet browsing
20
records, among other things.
On June 16, 2004, counsel for the charged parties appeared
before Judge Thomas D. Horne of the Loudoun County (Va.) Circuit
Court, to argue that Virginia's anti-spam law violated the First
Amendment, violated Due Process, offended double jeopardy
principles, and was inconsistent with the dormant Commerce
Clause. 21 On the last point, lawyers for the defendant contended that
the Virginia law constituted a per se violation of the dormant
Commerce Clause because it had the practical effect of controlling the
commerce of other states, the burden of the law on interstate
commerce outweighed any local benefits provided by the statute, and
application of the law subjected distributors of unsolicited bulk e-mail
22
to inconsistent state regulation.
Judge Horne held that the statute's practical effect was not to
regulate commerce occurring outside the Commonwealth of Virginia
and was therefore not a per se violation of the dormant Commerce
Clause. 23 Employing the two-step inquiry set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in Pike v. Bruce Church (discussed below),
Judge Horne found that the local benefits of the statute far
outweighed the burden placed on interstate commerce, which is that
24
bulk e-mails may not contain falsified routing information.
Judge Horne's ruling, generally upholding the Virginia statute
against all constitutional challenges, paved the way for Jaynes,
Rutkowski, and DeGroot to stand trial. 25 On October 25, 2004, the
trial for the three accused began. 26 On November 3, 2004, a jury
recommended a sentence of nine years in prison for Jeremy Jaynes, a
$7,500 fine for Jessica Jaynes DeGroot, and acquitted Richard
Rutkowski. 27 Jaynes and DeGroot became the first individuals in the
28
United States to be convicted of felony spam charges.
19.
Woman Indicted on Anti-Spam Laws, DAILY PRESS (VA.), Apr. 8, 2004, at C7.
20.
See Virginia Charges 2, supra note 15, at C1.
21.
Virginia v. Jaynes, 65 Va. Cir. 355, 356 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2004).
22.
Id. at 367.
23.
Id. at 369-70.
24.
Id. at 368-69.
25.
See id. at 371.
26.
Jon Swartz, First Felony Spam Trial Begins in Virginia, USA TODAY, Oct. 26,
2004, at 3B.
27.
Brulliard, supra note 16, at El.
28.
Id.
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B. Dormant Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution
provides that "[t]he Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate
Commerce ... among the several States. '2 9 It is now well-settled that
the Commerce Clause prevents states from legislating in certain
manners, lest they should infringe on Congressional prerogative to
regulate commerce. 30 This restriction on state power is known as the
dormant Commerce Clause. 3 1 Over the years, the Court has devised a
variety of tests to determine which types of state regulations pass
32
dormant Commerce Clause muster.
When a state law's purpose is to discriminate against out-ofstate commerce, either on its face or in effect, the Court has adopted a
test whereby "such facial discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny
of any purported legitimate local purpose and of the absence of
nondiscriminatory alternatives." 33 Obviously, this is a high hurdle for
a statute to overcome.

In Pike v. Bruce Church, the Court set forth its test to be
applied when a statute is not facially discriminatory:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then
the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
34
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.

Finally, the Court has used the dormant Commerce Clause to
invalidate regulations that would have an adverse impact on
interstate commerce by subjecting activities to inconsistent
regulations. 35
The theory underpinning this area of dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence is that some aspects of the national
commercial infrastructure require uniformity, which in turn requires
29.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
30.
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987).
31.
See id.
32.
Id.
33.
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979).
34.
397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (internal citations omitted).
35.
CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 88; see also Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State
Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 584 (1986) (stating that a statutory scheme that allows a state
to project its legislation beyond its borders would subject merchants to inconsistent
obligations in different states); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1852)
("[w]hatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit only of one
uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to
require exclusive legislation by Congress").
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that a single authority, Congress, prescribe all regulations in this
area. 36 This area of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is
somewhat less clearly defined than the tests applied to facially
discriminatory statutes and Pike statutes, but it is important to
Internet regulation. 37 In Healy v. The Beer Institute, the Court
affirmed the dormant Commerce Clause consideration that
regulations with the effect of projecting state regulation beyond its
borders offend the dormant Commerce Clause, since they interfere
38
with the legitimate regulatory regimes of other states.
C. The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Internet
The Internet presents unique and important issues in dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, especially with regard to the
regulation of spam. One of the seminal holdings in the area of the
dormant Commerce Clause's interaction with the Internet came in
American Library Ass'n v. Pataki.39 This case involved a challenge to
a New York statute designed to protect minors from pornographic
images on the Internet. 40 In this case, the district court held that the
New York statute "seeks to regulate communications occurring wholly
outside New York, imposes a burden on interstate commerce that is
disproportionate to the local benefits it is likely to engender, and
subjects plaintiffs, as well as other Internet users, to inconsistent
41
state obligations."
Particularly relevant to the Pataki court's analysis was its
observation that the Internet's amorphous geography presented a
unique likelihood that an individual might be subject to inconsistent
regulations by states regulating beyond their borders, a notion
offensive to the Commerce Clause. 42 The Pataki court asserted that
the Internet was one of the mediums of commerce that demanded
complete consistency in its regulation, and that Congress was the only
governmental entity that could legislate in this area with the
necessary level of consistency. 43 The consequence of inconsistent

36.
S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945).
37.
Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 789 (2001).
38.
491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989).
39.
969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
40.
Id. at 161-65.
41.
Id. at 167.
42.
Id. at 168-69.
43.
Id. at 169.
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regulation, the court stated, was the risk of paralyzing development of
44
the Internet.
The court also emphasized that the amorphous nature of the
Internet made it impossible for the New York statute to be limited to
purely intrastate communications over the Internet or for someone to
avoid liability by preventing New Yorkers from accessing materials
proscribed under the statute. 45 Thus, someone who was acting within
the law of his own state might run afoul of the New York law and be
subject to prosecution in New York despite compliance with his home
state's regulatory policies. The court conceptualized the Internet as a
mode of commerce analogous to highways or railroads. 46 As such, the
Internet "requires a cohesive national scheme of regulation so that
47
users are reasonably able to determine their obligations."
Further, the Pataki court seemed to suggest that all state
regulation of the Internet would face almost per se invalidity, since the
Internet's nature demands the sort of cohesive regulatory scheme that
only Congress can provide.
But in 2001, the Washington Supreme Court arrived at a very
different conclusion in State v. Heckel. 48 Jason Heckel, an Oregon
resident, was engaged in the business of sending spam to Washington
residents, among others. 4 9 Washington residents who had received
Heckel's spam complained to the Washington State Attorney General's
Office that Heckel's messages contained misleading information,
including misleading subject lines and false transmission paths. 50
Heckel was charged in violation of Washington's Commercial
Electronic Mail Act. 51 The statute provides that anyone falsifying a
commercial e-mail's point of origin, transmission path, or employing a
52
misleading subject line is in violation of the law.
The trial court granted Heckel's motion for summary judgment,
finding that the Washington act violated the Commerce Clause and
was "unduly restrictive and burdensome. '53 Engaging in the relevant
dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the Washington Supreme Court
quickly found that the statute was not facially discriminatory, in that

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id. at 171.
Id. at 182.
Id.
24 P.3d 404 (Wash. 2001).
Id. at 406.
Id. at 406-07.
See id. at 406.
Id. at 467 (citing Wash. Rev. Code § 19.190.030 (2004)).
Id. at 408.
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it regulated evenhandedly between Washington residents and out-of54
state residents.
Employing the second prong of dormant Commerce Clause
analysis, the court held that the Washington law also passed muster
under the balancing test set forth in Pike since the Act's local benefits
far outweighed any purported burden on interstate commerce. 55 In
finding a legitimate local benefit, the court emphasized the physical
and economic damage done to businesses and individuals by deceptive
commercial e-mail practices such as those employed by Heckel. 56 In
this regard, the court likened the sending of deceptive spam, and its
accompanying cost-shifting from advertisers to potential consumers, to
the sending of junk mail, postage due, or telemarketing calls to a pay57
per-minute cell phone.
In examining the burdens placed on interstate commerce, the
court observed that the only burden the Washington Act placed on
spammers was the requirement of truthfulness. 58 Far from burdening
commerce, the court noted, this requirement actually facilitated
commerce by reducing fraud and deception. 59 Furthermore, such a
requirement would serve to redress the problems caused by spam
since spamming would be a far less attractive endeavor were
60
spammers required to be truthful in all of their information.
The court addressed Heckel's contention that the statute
created an inconsistency among the states and that it regulated
conduct occurring wholly outside of Washington. 6 1 The court found
that the statute did not conflict with any of the requirements of other
states and that it would be inconceivable that any state would pass a
62
law requiring the use of deceptive practices in commercial e-mail.
The court further found that the differences between the act and the
anti-spam laws of other states did not impose extraordinary costs on
businesses employing spam. 63 As for regulating extraterritorially, the
court found that the act did not have a "sweeping extraterritorial
64
effect" that would outweigh the local benefits of the act.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 410.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 411.
Id.

60.
61.
62.

Id. (quoting Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 37, at 819).
Id. at 411-12.
Id. at 412.

63.
64.

Id.
Id.
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65
Finally, the court distinguished this case from that in Pataki.
The court noted that the statute in Pataki dealt not just with e-mail
messages, but with the Internet as a whole, subjecting individuals to
liability based on unintended access, whereas the statute in Heckel
reached only deceptive spam directed to a Washington resident or
66
initiated from a computer located in Washington.
Washington v. Heckel set a valuable precedent; one that the
67
California Court of Appeals noted in Ferguson v. Friendfinders,Inc.
In that case, Mark Ferguson brought suit against Friendfinders for
sending him spam that was allegedly deceptive and misleading in
violation of California's Business and Professions Code section
17538.4.68 Ferguson contended that Friendfinders had neglected to
include the prefix "ADV" in the subject line as required by law; that
the first line in the text of the messages had failed to contain
information about how recipients could have their e-mail addresses
removed from future promotions; that the e-mail messages failed to
provide a valid return e-mail address to which the recipient could
respond; and that the headers of the e-mails were altered to mask the
69
identity of the sender.
As in Heckel, the lower court found that California's law
violated the dormant Commerce Clause. 70 And just as in Heckel, the
court of appeals upheld the law against the Commerce Clause
challenge.71 The court disposed of the first prong of the dormant
Commerce Clause analysis quite handily, since Friendfinders
conceded that the law was not facially discriminatory. 72 Instead,
Friendfinders contended that the law regulated extraterritorially,
forcing spammers who do business in California to always 73comply with
California law regardless of the recipient's actual address.
Friendfinders pointed out that the amorphous geography of the
Internet makes geographic limitations on the scope of the California
law ineffectual.7 4 The court dismissed this argument, opining that the
California law did not regulate the amorphous Internet per se, but
that it did regulate individuals and entities that did have concrete

65.
66.

Id.
Id.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258 (Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 259.
Id. at 260-61.
Id. at 259-60.
Id. at 260.
Id. at 263.

73.

Id.

74.

Id. at 264.
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geographic locations. 75 The court rejected the proposition in Pataki
that any state regulation of Internet use violates the dormant
Commerce Clause, holding that the fact that the Internet is an
incident of interstate commerce does not automatically render a state
statute regulating Internet use violative of the dormant Commerce
76
Clause.
The court went on to distinguish Pataki (as did Heckel) on the
basis that the California law, unlike the law at issue in Pataki,did not
regulate the Internet as a whole, with all of its amorphous
geographical boundaries. 77 The court rejected the argument that
spammers would be subjected to inconsistent regulation, reasoning
that since the geographical limitations in the law are effectual, one
state regulation of
could theoretically comply with each individual
78
spam, without any inconsistent obligations.
Tracking the Pike analysis in Heckel, the court held that
stemming the flow of deceptive spam and its physical and economic
effects on individuals and businesses incident to its cost-shifting from
advertisers to consumers was a legitimate state interest. 79 The court
further noted that the burden posed by a law requiring spam to
employ no deception was minimal and did not outweigh the local
benefits. 80 Both Heckel and Ferguson, and what they represent
doctrinally, are extremely important and relevant to consideration of
Virginia's anti-spam law, as the Virginia law is very similar in many
regards.
Despite the analysis in both Heckel and Ferguson, controversy
remains as to the proper scope of state power to regulate the Internet.
As recently as 2003, the Second Circuit stated in American Booksellers
Foundation v. Dean that it is "likely that the Internet will soon be
seen as falling within the class of subjects that are protected from
State regulation because they 'imperatively demand[] a single uniform
rule.' "81 Although Dean did not involve Internet spam, the court's
sweeping proclamation seems to suggest that all state Internet
regulation is prohibited.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id. at 265.
Id.
Id. at 266.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 268-69.
342 F.3d 96, 104 (2d Cir. 2003).
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II. ARE STATE SPAM STATUTES STILL GOOD LAW?

A. The CAN-SPAMAct: Content and Criticisms
On December 16, 2003, Congress passed the Controlling the
Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act, popularly
known as the "CAN-SPAM Act" ("the Act"). 82 The Act officially took
effect on January 1, 2004.83 The federal government adopted the Act,
in part, because of findings that the receipt of unsolicited e-mail
messages accounts for over half of all e-mail traffic, results in added
costs to recipients and Internet service providers, results in the risk
that legitimate messages will be lost in a flood of unwanted messages,
and often contains fraudulent or misleading information.8 4 The Act
established measures designed to combat spam such as a Do-Not-EMail registry8 5 .
As soon as the Act was passed, however, one particular
provision of the Act became a lightning rod for criticism. The
provision at issue stated that the Act supersedes all state statutes,
rules, and regulations that regulate the sending of commercial e-mail,
except to the extent that any such regulation addresses falsification or
deception in spam e-mails.8 6 While this measure had the advantage of
increasing the uniformity of commercial e-mail regulation, it raised
immediate concern that tough state anti-spam measures would be
gutted and rendered ineffectual by the Act.87 The Act preempted
statutes such as California's, which did not particularly relate to
deceptive or fraudulent e-mailing practices.8 8 Before the passage of
the Act, the Attorneys General of forty-four states came out strongly
against the Act, arguing that it was minimally protective to
consumers and contained too many exceptions and loopholes for
effective enforcement. 8 9 Fears regarding the Act have proven to be
well-founded. Perversely, since the passage of the Act, spam has
increased from comprising fifty-sixty percent of all e-mails sent to
eighty percent of all e-mails sent. 90

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

15 U.S.C. § 7701 (West 2005).
Id.
Id. § 7701 (2)-(4), (8).
See id. § 7708(1).
Id. § 7707(a)(2), (b)(1).
Blanke, supra note 3, at 317.
Id.
Id.
Zeller, supra note 6, at Al.
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B. The VirginiaLaw and FederalPreemption
The question remains whether the Act preempts Virginia's
anti-spam statute. For Jeremy Jaynes and Rutkowski, the issue is
moot since Virginia charged them under the Virginia law just days
before the Act passed.9 1 For those seeking to determine the continuing
viability of Virginia's law under the dormant Commerce Clause, the
issue is quite important since the statute will only raise dormant
Commerce Clause issues if it is still in force. Some commentators
suggest that Virginia's law must give way before the federal law.9 2 In
all likelihood, however, the Act did not preempt the Virginia law. The
relevant portion of the Act states:
This Act supersedes any statute, regulation, or rule of a State or political
subdivision of a State that expressly regulates the use of electronic mail to send
commercial messages, except to the extent that any such statute, regulation, or
rule prohibits falsity or deception in any93portion of a commercial electronic mail
message or information attached thereto.

The relevant portions of the Virginia law state:
A. Any person who:
1. Uses a computer or computer network with the intent to falsify or forge
electronic mail transmission information or other routing information in any
manner in connection with the transmission of unsolicited bulk electronic mail
through or into the computer network of an electronic mail service provider or its
subscribers; or
2. Knowingly sells, gives, or otherwise distributes or possesses with the intent
to sell, give, or distribute software that (i) is primarily designed or produced for the
purpose of facilitating or enabling the falsification of electronic mail transmission
information or other routing information; (ii) has only limited commercially
significant purpose or use other than to facilitate or enable the falsification of
electronic mail transmission information or other routing information; or (iii) is
marketed by that person acting alone or with another for use in facilitating or
information or other
enabling the falsification of electronic mail transmission
94
routing information is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.

Clearly, the language of the Virginia statute deals with
falsification and deceptive practices in sending spam e-mails. Thus,
this would place the Virginia law within the exception for preemption
contained within 15 U.S.C. § 7707 for statutes that address such

91.
See supra Part L.A
See Paul Rubell, Technology Law and Practice;New FederalLaw to Take Effect,
92.
But Will Spam Be Conquered?, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 23, 2003, at 16 ("It would seem that the
heart of the Virginia statute under which the indictments against Mssrs. Jaynes and
Rutkowski were brought.., will be preempted by the CAN-SPAM Act.").
93.
CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(1) (West 2005).
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.3:1 (2004) (emphasis added).
94.

490

VANDERBILT J. OFENTERTANMENTAND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 8:2:477

falsification practices. Other state laws may not be so fortunate in
surviving 'the Act's preemption.
C. The Virginia Law and the Dormant Commerce Clause: Defusing the
"NuclearBomb"

Some commentators have characterized the dormant
Commerce Clause as "a nuclear bomb of a legal theory against state
Internet regulations." 95 Despite its appearance, this statement proves
not to be a great exaggeration, at least where the courts in American
97
Library Ass'n v. Pataki96 and American Booksellers Found. v. Dean
are concerned. Dean's clear and explicit proposition that it is "likely
that the Internet will soon be seen as falling within the class of
subjects that are protected from State regulation because they
'imperatively demandf a single uniform rule,' "98 would certainly
appear to doom any measures on the part of states such as Virginia to
regulate unwanted bulk e-mails. Dean also stated that "[b]ecause the
Internet does not recognize geographic boundaries, it is difficult, if not
impossible, for a state to regulate Internet activities without
'projecting its legislation into other States.' 99 While this case is from
a different federal circuit than Virginia, a closer examination of the
statute and regulated activities at issue here reveal that the Virginia
statute would probably pass muster even in the Second Circuit, the
locale of the Dean ruling, in spite of any sweeping and perhaps overly
broad pronouncements to the contrary.
While it is technically true that spam is an omnipresent part of
the Internet landscape, it presents some very different issues than the
activities in Dean and Pataki, which led to the Dean court's
pessimistic view of the constitutionality of any state attempts to
regulate the Internet.
In Dean, the activity at issue was the
maintenance of sexually oriented websites accessible to minors, in
violation of Vermont law. 100 The court found that because the
websites at issue were accessible to Vermont residents, website
operators in states outside of Vermont would have to comply with the
Vermont law to avoid incurring liability. 101 Thus, Vermont had
95.

Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 37, at 78.

96.

969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

342 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2003).
Id. at 104 (quoting Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1852)).
Id. at 103 (quoting Healy v. Beer, Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 334 (1989)).
See id. at 98-101.
Id. at 103-104.
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effectively projected its legislation into the rest of nation, and indeed
the world. 10 2 Every website in the world would be required to comport
with the Vermont law. Furthermore, the court found that there is no
practical way, with existing technology, for the purveyors of a website
to prevent Vermont minors from accessing the site, in order that they
might comply with the Vermont law. 10 3 The pervasive problem with
websites is the fact that their passive nature allows people to access
them with very little control by the website's creators and
maintainers. 104 It is this problem that led the court in Dean to
pronounce broadly that there could be no state Internet regulation.
Spam, however, presents a slightly different issue than passive
websites; passive websites involve two-way communications between a
computer and a server on which a website is stored, while unwanted emails involve a one-way transmission from sender to receiver. 105
There are suggestions that, while there are many ways emerging for a
website operator to determine the geographical origins of users
downloading content from their websites, it is practically impossible
for senders of spam e-mail to identify in advance and delete from their
mass e-mail lists any recipients in jurisdictions with laws unfavorable
to their activities. 10 6 Since there are no jurisdictions at present that
completely prohibit spam e-mail, one wishing to "play it safe" in all
jurisdictions need only comply with the requirements of each
jurisdiction.
Judge Thomas D. Horne, who upheld the Virginia law against
a dormant Commerce Clause challenge in Virginia v. Jaynes, noted
that "[a] survey of state laws regulating bulk electronic mail finds that
none conflict with the Virginia statute. . . [it] can be harmonized with
all such state statutes."107 Assuming that Judge Horne's statement is
true, the mere fact that Virginia's statute is consistent with other
state statutes, or that one may continue to engage in the sending of
unsolicited bulk e-mail so long as proper precautions are taken, does

102.
Id.
103.
Id. at 103.
104.
It currently appears to be the case that website operators have little control
over who may access the content of their sites. See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 37, at
808-13 for their insightful discussion on emerging technologies which will allow, among
other things, for the purveyors of websites to identify people's geographic origin by
identifying the source of the Internet protocol (IP) address of their computer. Goldsmith
and Sykes suggest that such geographical identification technologies could be used to tailor
content by geography and comply with various state laws regulating the Internet. See id.
105.
Id. at 812.
106.
Id.
107.
Virginia v. Jaynes, 65 Va. Cir. 355, 369 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2004).
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not immunize the Virginia statute from dormant Commerce Clause
problems.
1. Facially Discriminatory?
A state statute may violate the dormant Commerce Clause in
several ways. First, when a state statute is facially discriminatory
toward out-of-state commerce, it is nearly always per se invalid under
the dormant Commerce Clause.10 8 The Court has adopted a test
whereby "such facial discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny of
any purported legitimate local purpose and of the absence of
nondiscriminatory alternatives."' 10 9

The Virginia law is not facially discriminatory, nor has there
been any contention that it is. Certainly, this was not Jaynes'
argument when he brought his constitutional claim. 110 For the
Virginia statute to be facially discriminatory, it would have to do
something akin to allowing Virginia residents to send unsolicited bulk
e-mail with falsified information to Virginia residents, while
disallowing the residents of other states to send unsolicited bulk email with falsified information to Virginia residents. Considering the
deleterious effects of unsolicited bulk e-mail, one might argue
compellingly for the importance of the legitimate local purpose.
Arguing that such a discriminatory measure was the only option
available, however, would present a greater hurdle.
2. An Undue Burden Under the Pike Balancing Test?
In contrast to a.facially discriminatory statute, a law may
violate the dormant Commerce Clause if it unduly burdens interstate
commerce in relation to the local benefit sought to be achieved. 1 ' In
such a case, the reviewing court is charged with applying the
balancing test laid out in Pike v. Bruce Church, whereby a court looks
to the legitimacy of the state's regulatory interest in the statute, and
the burden on commerce is weighed against the local benefit. 1 2
Judge Horne, in his Pike analysis of the Virginia statute,
quoted commentators stating:

108.

Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979).

109.

Id.

110.
Cf. Jaynes, 65 Va. Cir. at 367 (not describing the
discriminatory while asserting the unconstitutional defense).
111.
Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).

112.

Id.

statute as facially
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Even assuming that the antispam laws do not significantly further the state's
interest, it is hard to see how the anti-spam laws burden interstate commerce at
all. The spain laws essentially require truthfulness in the header, return address,
and subject line of the e-mail. Far from burdening commerce,
the truthfulness
113
requirement facilitates it by eliminating fraud and deception.

It is difficult to take serious issue with the result reached here
that a requirement of honesty in sending unsolicited bulk e-mails is
minimally burdensome, especially when taken in light of the local
interest in eliminating such deceptive practices.
3. Projecting Legislation Beyond Virginia's Borders?
The next means by which a state law may run afoul of the
dormant Commerce Clause is by projecting state legislation outside
the state's borders. 114 Legislation that regulates extraterritorially is,
like facially discriminatory legislation, nearly always subject to per se
invalidity. 115 Here, Judge Horne points out that the Virginia statute
only reaches those who send unsolicited bulk e-mail to Virginia
residents; that it must be established that the e-mail reached a
Virginia resident. 1 16 In other words, the Virginia law would never
penalize someone from North Carolina for sending an unsolicited bulk
e-mail message to someone in Tennessee, for example, assuming that
at no time the e-mail passed through Virginia.
This, however, may not be the only way the Virginia statute
could potentially regulate extraterritorially. Assume for a moment,
using the North Carolina/Tennessee example, that there is no law
against sending unsolicited bulk e-mail in either of those states. The
normal functioning of the Internet often results in sent e-mail
messages being routed through servers in places other than the locale
of the intended recipient or sender. The sender of the e-mail has little
or no control over how and when this occurs. Thus, a lawfully sent email with falsified information might unintentionally pass through
Virginia, thus subjecting the sender to criminal liability in Virginia,
even though both sender and recipient lived in states in which such
activities were perfectly legal.
In this regard, this example would be more akin to the
objectionable website content cases, such as Dean and Pataki, in
which the courts seemed to suggest wholesale that the states could not

113.
114.
115.
116.

Jaynes, 65 Va. Cir. at 370 (quoting Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 37, at 819).
Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989).
Id. at 332.
Jaynes, 65 Va. Cir. at 368.
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regulate the Internet. 117 In both of those cases, one of the important
considerations was that the state subjected the operators of a website
to liability in a state where they did not seek to do business. 118 These
arguments are probably similar to the arguments Jaynes's attorneys
made in his case, which did not carry the day.
Even where it is relatively easy to comply with state
regulations, such as by adding specialized information to the subject
line, it is difficult to see how a state is not regulating to some extent
an activity occurring wholly outside its borders. At present, dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence says that extraterritorial regulation
is per se invalid. Where the burden is relatively light, however, the
courts seem to apply a less stringent standard than per se invalidity.
In support of his position rejecting the argument that the
Virginia law regulated extraterritorially, Judge Horne cited a U.S.
Supreme Court case upholding an Arkansas law requiring railroads to
have a specific number of crewmembers aboard a train, even though
the train was merely passing through the state en route to some final
destination." 9 In that case, one might argue that the railroad had
some control over the way its trains were routed, so that if it elected
not to abide by Arkansas law, it could simply incur the expense of
taking an alternate route that did not pass through Arkansas. The
cost-benefit analysis would be the railroad's to make. In the case of a
sender of unsolicited bulk e-mail, the sender could conceivably have
far less control over where her message is routed, and through what
jurisdictions it might pass. This is just one example of how the
extraterritorial regulation inquiry would require a much more
sensitive, fact-specific inquiry in cases involving the Internet. This is
not to suggest that the Virginia statute is illegal by virtue of its
potential tendency to regulate extraterritorially, but rather simply
that the possibility exists. This may require courts to take a fresh look
at extraterritorial regulation doctrine, in light of the unique issues
that the Internet poses.
4. Subjecting Spammers to Inconsistent Regulations?
The final means by which a law regulating unsolicited bulk email might violate the dormant Commerce Clause is by subjecting
activities to inconsistent regulations when taken in conjunction with
117.
See Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 104 (2d Cir. 2003); Am.
Library Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 187-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
118.
See Dean, 342 F.3d at 103; Pataki,969 F. Supp. at 183.
119.
Jaynes, 65 Va. Cir. at 370 (citing Bhd.Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v.
Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 393 U.S. 129, 135 (1968)).

2006]

UNSOLICITEDBULK COMMERCIAL E-MAIL

other state statutes. 120 Judge Horne found that the Virginia law did
not subject senders of unsolicited bulk e-mail to inconsistent
regulation, since the Virginia law's requirements of truthfulness in
the header, return address, and subject line of the e-mail did not
conflict with any other state statutes on the books. 121 The difficulty
with this doctrine is that it upholds Virginia law when taken alone,
but when considered with other laws, it then becomes invalid under
the doctrine. By the same token, every other state law might be valid
when taken alone, but when viewed as a unitary whole, they all
become invalid if they are inconsistent with one another. Either all
could be seen as invalid, or courts could strike down the newcomer
statute that raises the inconsistency. This could raise a quandary,
although it does not for the Virginia statute. The Virginia statute's
saving grace with regard to consistency of regulation would seem to be
that it does not ban unsolicited bulk e-mail outright, but that it
targets e-mail with falsified information. This allows it to mesh
relatively easily with other state statutes, since it is inconceivable that
a state anti-spam law would require e-mails to have falsified
information.
In sum, it appears that the drafters of the Virginia statute
have succeeded in carefully crafting a statute, based on the
experiences of Washington and California, that will withstand
dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. 122 This is not to say that the
statute may not eventually be overturned on some other constitutional
grounds, such as Free Speech or substantive Due Process, but it
appears that any statute that follows Virginia's lead will at the very
123
least pass dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.
120.
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987); see also Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 584 (1986) (stating that a
statutory scheme that allows a state to project its legislation beyond its borders would
subject merchants to inconsistent obligations in different states); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens,
53 U.S. 299, 319 (1852) ("[w]hatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or
admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a
nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress").
121.
Jaynes, 65 Va. Cir. at 370.
122.
See, e.g., Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258 (Ct. App. 2002);
State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404 (Wash 2001).
123.
While this Note does not examine the First Amendment implications of the
Virginia law, one may intuit quite easily that since the Virginia law does not ban
unsolicited bulk e-mail outright, but only deceptive practices in sending unsolicited bulk email, that it would probably safely withstand a First Amendment challenge. To suggest
otherwise is to suggest that the First Amendment protects the right of individuals to make
all manner of fraudulent claims, a proposition that is untenable. In fact, Jaynes and his codefendants did bring a First Amendment challenge to the Virginia law, which did not
prevail. See Jaynes, 65 Va. Cir. at 357-62 for the discussion of Jeremy Jaynes's First
Amendment challenge to the Virginia law.
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III. Do WE WANT THE STATES REGULATING THE INTERNET?

The question that remains after a dormant Commerce Clause
analysis of the Virginia law is this: Virginia and other states may
technically be able to legislate against unsolicited bulk e-mail ...

but

should they?
The courts in Dean and Pataki seem to think that it is unwise,
given the nature of the Internet as an instrumentality of commerce, to
allow states to regulate in this arena at all. 124 Indeed, there is some
undeniable logic to this view. If the federal government steps in to
legislate against spam, as it did with the CAN-SPAM Act, it
eliminates the dormant Commerce Clause problem altogether, since
the dormant Commerce Clause applies only to state legislation. 125
Certainly, it would give those who wish to engage in the practice of
unsolicited bulk e-mailing the ability to work with greater certainty.
With a single, federal standard, senders of unsolicited bulk e-mail
would have to deal only with a unitary standard of regulation, as
opposed to the patchwork of state regulations that existed before the
CAN-SPAM Act's preemption, and to some extent (at least where
statutes dealing with fraud and deceptive practices are concerned)
after the passage of the Act.
Herein lies the first reason why it may be wise to continue to
allow states to legislate against unwanted bulk e-mails. To the extent
that a single, federal standard would make it easier for spam emailers to ply their trade, this will be an economically undesirable
result. The tendency of spam e-mail is to shift the cost of promotion
and advertisement from businesses advertising to the consumer. 126
Like unwanted faxes, spam e-mails impose a cost on the recipient by
co-opting space on servers and networks, employee time spent deleting
them, and countless other ways. 127 Perhaps one of the best solutions
to the problem is simply to shift some of the cost of spamming back to
the spammers by forcing them to negotiate a vast array of slightly
varying but nonetheless consistent state laws. Currently, spamming
is such a lucrative and low-cost endeavor that there is little economic
incentive to not become involved in some way in spamming. 128
Perhaps, by not allowing purveyors of spam the certainty that a single

124.
Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 104 (2d Cir. 2003); Am. Library
Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
125.
CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 87.
126.
Krim, supra note 5, at Al.
127.
Id.
128.
Id.
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federal standard would provide, society might be able to provide some
financial and legal disincentive to become involved in spamming.
If socially and economically destructive Internet behavior has
shown one tendency thus far, it is its ability to adapt with fiendish
speed to outstrip any efforts to regulate it. For example, it seems that
every time a peer-to-peer media file-sharing network is shut down,
another steps up to fill the void. With the money to be had spamming,
it is in spammers' best interest to apply their time, energies, and
talents to quickly circumvent any attempt at regulation. 129 The
federal government should not make it easier for spammers to engage
in their business by handing them the ability, on a silver platter, to
work with greater certainty. This is especially true when, as some
argue, the current federal statute regulating spain does not go far
enough in achieving its ends.
The fact that a patchwork of state regulations would reduce the
ability of spammers to work with greater certainty, and thereby
produce a financial disincentive to continue an activity which has
substantial social costs, is just an ancillary benefit to states legislating
against spam. Another benefit to allowing states to legislate in this
arena is greater local accountability. Where state legislatures and
state attorneys general are directly accountable to their constituencies
for the passage and enforcement of robust anti-spain laws, it would
seem that there would be greater likelihood of those laws being
enforced. While it is true that the CAN-SPAM Act contains a
provision providing for state attorneys general to bring a civil action
against violators of the CAN-SPAM Act and reap substantial
damages, there is no mention of the possibility of criminal liability
under the CAN-SPAM Act. 130 To a spammer, like Jeremy Jaynes, who
amassed an estimated $24 million personal fortune from spamming, it
would have taken a very large damage award indeed to serve as a
13 1
deterrent.
Thus, local lawmakers and law enforcement officials, whose
activities are more likely to be closely scrutinized by their local
electorates, have a substantial incentive to pass and enforce tough
laws such as Virginia's, which mandate criminal penalties for spain
insofar as the federal government is unwilling or unable to do so.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that the federal government, busy with
more pressing and immediate concerns, would have a great deal of

129.
See Schwartz, supra note 8, at A20.
130.
15 U.S.C. § 7706 (West 2005).
131.
Prosecutors estimated Jeremy Jaynes's personal fortune from spamming at $24
million. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at A20.
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time or energy to spend going after spammers, especially if lawmakers
and those charged with enforcing the law are relatively insulated from
local constituencies and the accountability they demand.
Finally, the greatest advantage to having spam regulation and
enforcement in the hands of states is adaptability. The Internet has
shown itself, as a medium, to be notoriously difficult to regulate due to
its high level of adaptability and innovation. Laws designed to
regulate Internet activity are almost inevitably destined for nearobsolescence within months due to the ability of Internet users to
adapt their methods, practices, technologies, and even geographical
locations to quickly skirt any regulation attempt. The only hope that
exists for even approaching a workable standard of Internet
regulation is to leave states free to quickly innovate and adapt in
order to meet changing circumstances and shifting technologies.
Justice Brandeis once said of the American federal system: "[i]t
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country." 132 This comment means, in the context of spam
regulation, that instead of having one "laboratory," the federal
government, working on the problem of effective spain regulation.
Internet users could have 50 separate "laboratories," each working to
provide innovations, each working with great accountability to the
local constituency.
It is in these 50 laboratories that the greatest hope for actually
approaching the effective regulation of spam lies, since it will simply
prove too unwieldy and slow to attempt to engage the machinery of
the United States Congress to pass a new federal statute every time
spammers manage to innovate their way around the latest statute.
Additionally, as discussed above, even if a new statute were passed to
deal with each new innovation, spammers would only have to
concentrate their time, talents, and energies on overcoming the
strictures of a single statute. They would not have to go through the
time and trouble of staying abreast of new developments in state spam
regulation.
In each of these state "laboratories," states would be free to
experiment with regulation schemes and various types of penalties,
both civil and criminal. From these testing grounds would eventually
emerge evidence regarding which methods work best in restricting
and regulating spam. This would avoid the current situation, where a
132.
dissenting).

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
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federal statute contains a provision preempting many state anti-spam
laws before they see the light of day, certainly before they have had
very much time to prove their effectiveness (or lack thereof). At the
very least, it would maintain the federal system, whereby states
retain the police power to regulate in the best interest of their
citizenry, and any of the advantages that system holds.
Virginia's law shows that it is possible for states to regulate
spam, despite the amorphous, geographically fluid nature of the
Internet, and not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. This is not
to say, however, that the tests the courts currently use to analyze
dormant Commerce Clause problems will continue to be applicable to
future Internet cases and spam regulation cases.
The dormant
Commerce Clause is, at its core, a judge-made doctrine. 133 Judges
should continue to be sensitive of the unique demands of Internet
regulation, and the unique abilities of the various states to experiment
and meet those demands, in determining whether the current tests, as
traditionally applied, are appropriate to the challenges presented by
this communication medium.
Finally, if Congress is to insist on replacing state anti-spam
statutes with a single, overarching statute, it should go to great
lengths to ensure that it is providing Internet users with at least as
much protection as they would receive if they lived in a state that took
a hard-line on spam. For example, Congress should look to Virginia's
lead in creating criminal penalties for spammers, the likes of which
will hopefully deter spamming even where monetary penalties will do
little.
In sum, Virginia's experience shows that it is possible for states
to pass laws regulating unsolicited bulk e-mail while staying within
the bounds of the dormant Commerce Clause, even as it is currently
applied. It would be best for states to continue to regulate against
spam, as they are able to be more responsive in a speedier manner
and experiment with various regulatory schemes without requiring
the participation of the entire United States Congress. It is at the
state legislative level that regulatory schemes will best be able to meet
new innovations in spamming that would render a single federal law
obsolete. Finally, a desirable by-product of a patchwork of varied state
spam legislation would be that those wishing to engage in the
business of spamming would have to continually stay abreast of new
developments in the law and incur the costs of compliance with such a
web of laws.

133.

CTS Corp. v. Dynamics of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987).
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IV. CONCLUSION

Whatever the attempted solution to the spam problem, the
unavoidable conclusion is this: spam has to stop, or at the very least, it
cannot continue to exist in its current form.
It is simply too
destructive to the infrastructure and functioning of the Internet to
allow individuals to reap financial reward by sending unsolicited bulk
e-mail in such a manner so as to shift costs from the advertiser to the
targeted consumer. Coupled with this threat to the functioning of the
Internet is the fact that the nature of the Internet quite easily allows
for spamming operations to be moved overseas, beyond the reach of
American authorities.
The time may have arrived for the Supreme Court to
fundamentally rethink and retool its dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence to account for the geographical amorphousness of the
Internet. Gone are the days in which the dormant Commerce Clause
applied to the regulation of such concrete mediums of commerce such
as railroads and highways. The information superhighway is a very
different animal, presenting very different issues. If current dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence is too inflexible to deal with the
unique issues presented by spam and legislative attempts to regulate
it, the time may have arrived to reshape those doctrines to meet a
changing world.
A fundamental rethinking, however, may not even be
necessary. Perhaps all that is necessary is for courts to take a very
hard look at the actual functioning of statutes, combined with a solid
grasp of the precise workings of the Internet. The Virginia statute
provides an excellent example of a statute that appears to be able to
pass muster even under current dormant Commerce Clause thinking
and law. There is one substantial potential shortcoming in the
Virginia statute, however: the statute only regulates fraudulent or
misleading spam. The problem here is that, while fraudulent spai
may end up creating greater costs to businesses and consumers,
perfectly legitimate spai employing no deceit, fraud, or artifice
whatsoever also entails substantial costs to society and businesses. It
is apparent that something must be done about this problem as well.
Virginia's statute, for all of its strictness, probably is not tough
enough. As can be seen from the fact that spain now accounts for 80
percent of all e-mails sent, even after the CAN-SPAM Act was passed
and Jaynes was prosecuted1 34 , one may easily conclude that laws such

134.

Zeller, supra note 6, at Al.
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as Virginia's that touch only on fraudulent spam may not even be
sufficient to stem the tide of spain.
It also seems quite apparent that there is no "magic pill" that
will cure the problem of spam. Indeed, it may require a highly
coordinated combination of statutory regulation, tax schemes, and
other legislative solutions to reduce or eliminate the costs that spain
imposes upon businesses and society. Legislators must be informed
about the issues attendant to spam and educated on the way that the
Internet functions. The only way to fight the ability of those who
would use the Internet to destructive ends and innovate their way
around regulation is to counter with high levels of legislative
innovation and responsiveness.
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